When Prevention Is Replaced by Permission
What the Mey BESS Decision Reveals About Risk, Regulation and Public Protection
The Scottish planning and consent system is intended to act as a safeguard. Its purpose is to identify genuine risks to people, the environment and place, and to intervene before harm occurs. The recent approval of the Mey Battery Energy Storage System at Philips Mains Farm in Caithness raises serious questions about whether that preventative role is still being fulfilled.
This decision is not simply about a single development. It offers a clear case study of how known risks are now treated within the regulatory process, and how acknowledgement of those risks does not necessarily translate into meaningful restraint.
A Development Approved With Known Impacts
The approved scheme involves a grid-scale Battery Energy Storage System with an export capacity of approximately 300 megawatts, comprising around 288 containerised lithium-ion battery units and associated electrical infrastructure. The determination letter confirms that the site lies within a rural agricultural area and that the development will operate for a period of up to thirty years.
The decision explicitly recognises that the proposal will introduce changes to the landscape, generate operational noise, create construction and maintenance traffic, and result in visual and environmental effects. These impacts are not disputed or dismissed. They are acknowledged as real, but judged to be acceptable within the overall balance applied by Ministers.
Public Objections Were Registered, Not Resolved
The determination records that a substantial number of public representations were received objecting to the proposal. The concerns raised were wide-ranging but consistent. They included fire risk associated with lithium-ion batteries, impacts on cultural heritage including the Castle of Mey, harm to tourism and the rural economy, loss of agricultural land, noise impacts, cumulative industrialisation, inadequate consultation, and the absence of an Environmental Impact Assessment.
These issues were formally summarised within the decision itself. This is important. It confirms that the risks were not hypothetical or unknown to decision-makers. They were placed clearly on the record before consent was granted.
However, once statutory objections from consultees were withdrawn, public opposition no longer carried decisive weight. The process allowed objections to be made, but it did not require those objections to be resolved in a way that altered the outcome.
Risk Acknowledged but Deferred
A defining feature of the determination is its treatment of risk. The decision does not claim that lithium-ion battery systems are risk-free. Fire risk is explicitly noted as an issue raised by objectors. Nor does it deny that rural emergency response capacity is a relevant consideration. Instead, the decision concludes that such risks can be addressed through planning conditions, operational requirements, and other regulatory regimes.
This represents a shift away from a preventative approach. Rather than requiring risks to be fully resolved before consent is granted, the system accepts that they can be managed later. Approval is given first, with safeguards deferred to future stages of implementation and regulation.
Lithium-Ion Fire Risk and Preventative Failure
Lithium-ion battery technology has recognised failure modes, including thermal runaway events that are difficult to control once initiated. The determination does not state that such events cannot occur. It relies instead on the existence of management plans, access arrangements, and compliance with other legislation.
This approach moves responsibility from prevention to response. It accepts that developments with known hazards may proceed, on the basis that systems will react if something goes wrong. In doing so, it places communities and environments in a position where the consequences of failure are addressed only after risk has already materialised.
The Absence of an Environmental Impact Assessment
The decision confirms that the development was screened as not requiring an Environmental Impact Assessment. This point was raised repeatedly by objectors and is acknowledged within the determination itself.
The absence of an EIA means that the cumulative, long-term and worst-case effects of the development were not examined through the most comprehensive assessment mechanism available. Despite this, the determination concludes that sufficient information existed to make an informed decision and that a public inquiry was not required.
This further illustrates the system’s willingness to proceed in the presence of uncertainty, rather than pausing to reduce that uncertainty where credible risks have been identified.
From Safeguard to Permission Mechanism
Taken together, the decision demonstrates how a system designed to protect public and environmental interests can instead become a mechanism for permitting risk to pass through. Known impacts are acknowledged. Known risks are recorded. Yet the threshold for refusal or further scrutiny remains high, while the threshold for approval continues to fall.
This is not a failure of process in a technical sense. The system has operated as it is currently structured under section 36 of the Electricity Act. It is, however, a failure of purpose. Prevention has become optional, while policy alignment has become decisive.
Accountability Is Created by the Record
The determination letter now stands as a formal record. It shows that risks were raised in advance, summarised clearly, and understood by decision-makers. Approval was granted with that knowledge.
This matters for accountability. If impacts arise in the future, they will not be unforeseen. The record shows that they were identified and consciously accepted. The issue, therefore, is not one of alarm or speculation, but of transparency and responsibility.
The Mey BESS decision illustrates a wider trend in which regulatory systems increasingly tolerate uncertainty and known risk in pursuit of policy objectives. It raises a fundamental question for planning, environmental protection and public trust: when prevention is set aside, who carries the consequences when risk becomes reality?
One Reply to “When Prevention Is Replaced by Permission”
Andy hayton
Approval of Mey Battery Scheme Shows Scotland’s Planning System No Longer Prevents Harm
The Scottish planning and consent system is supposed to act as a safeguard — identifying genuine risks to people, the environment and place, and intervening before harm occurs.
The recent approval of the Mey Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Caithness raises serious doubts about whether that safeguard still functions.
This is not just about one development. The Mey decision exposes how known risks are now handled in Scotland’s energy consent system — acknowledged, recorded, and then waved through.
A Scheme Approved With Its Impacts Fully Known
Ministers approved a grid-scale lithium-ion battery installation of around 300 megawatts, made up of roughly 288 containerised battery units, on rural farmland near the Castle of Mey. The project is expected to operate for up to 30 years.
The government’s own decision letter accepts that the development will:
• alter the landscape,
• generate noise,
• increase traffic,
• industrialise a rural area,
• and create environmental and visual impacts.
These effects were not disputed. They were accepted — and approved anyway.
Public Objections Were Logged, Not Resolved
Large numbers of public objections were submitted, raising consistent concerns:
• lithium-ion battery fire risk,
• toxic smoke and emergency response capacity,
• impacts on the Castle of Mey and cultural heritage,
• harm to tourism and agriculture,
• cumulative industrialisation,
• lack of consultation,
• and the absence of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).
Crucially, these concerns are summarised in the decision itself. This proves ministers were fully aware of them before granting consent.
Once statutory consultees withdrew objections, public concerns no longer altered the outcome. The system allowed objections to be made — but not to matter.
Risk Acknowledged, Then Deferred
The decision does not claim that lithium-ion battery systems are risk-free. Fire risk is explicitly noted. Rural emergency response limitations are acknowledged.
Instead of resolving those risks before approval, ministers concluded they could be dealt with later — through planning conditions, management plans, or other regulatory regimes.
That marks a fundamental shift: from preventing risk to managing the consequences after consent is granted.
Fire Risk Accepted, Not Prevented
Lithium-ion battery fires and thermal runaway events are a recognised hazard internationally. The government does not deny this.
Approval was granted on the basis that if something goes wrong, systems will respond — not that failure has been ruled out. Communities are expected to live alongside a known hazard, trusting that mitigation will work if tested.
That is not prevention. It is acceptance.
No Environmental Impact Assessment
Despite the scale of the development and the risks raised, ministers confirmed that no Environmental Impact Assessment was required.
This means cumulative impacts, worst-case scenarios, and long-term effects were never examined through the strongest assessment process available. Yet the government concluded it had “enough information” to approve the project and refused a public inquiry.
Uncertainty was tolerated — not reduced.
From Safeguard to Rubber Stamp
Taken together, the Mey decision shows how Scotland’s consent system has shifted.
Risks are acknowledged. Impacts are recorded. But refusal thresholds remain high, while approval has become the default.
This is not a procedural error. The system has worked exactly as currently designed under Section 36 of the Electricity Act. That is the problem.
The Record Now Creates Accountability
The decision letter now stands as a permanent record that risks were raised in advance and consciously accepted.
If harm occurs in the future, it will not be unforeseen. The government was warned — and approved regardless.
The question this decision leaves behind is simple and unavoidable:
If prevention is no longer the purpose of planning and consent, who carries the consequences when risk becomes reality?
Andy Hayton